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Abstract
This paper develops a framework for assessing systemic risks and for predicting (out- 
of-sample) systemic events, i.e. periods of extreme financial instability with potential 
real costs. We test the ability of a wide range of “stand alone” and composite 
indicators in predicting systemic events and evaluate them by taking into account 
policy makers’ preferences between false alarms and missing signals. Our results 
highlight the importance of considering jointly various indicators in a multivariate 
framework. We find that taking into account jointly domestic and global macro-
financial vulnerabilities greatly improves the performance of discrete choice models 
in forecasting systemic events. Our framework shows a good out-of-sample 
performance in predicting the last financial crisis. Finally, our model would have 
emergence of money markets tensions in August 2007.
JEL Codes: E44, E58, F01, F37, G01.
Keywords: Early warning Indicators, Asset Price Booms and Busts, Financial 
Stress, Macro-Prudential Policies. 
issued an early warning signal for the United States in 2006 Q2, 5 quarters before the 5
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Non-technical summary 
This paper contributes to the financial crisis literature by developing a unified 
framework for assessing systemic risks, stemming from domestic and global macro-
financial vulnerabilities, and for predicting (out-of-sample) systemic events i.e. 
periods of extreme financial instability with potential real costs. Within this 
framework it is possible to assess the relative importance of the factors contributing to 
the probability of a systemic event. 
We extend the existing literature on predicting financial crises in several ways. First, 
we identify past systemic events by using a composite financial stress index 
measuring the level of systemic tensions in the financial system of a country. This 
approach provides an objective criterion for defining the starting date of a crisis and it 
contrasts with the standard way of identifying crises that exploits qualitative 
information (see e.g. Laeven and Valencia, 2008). Second, in predicting the identified 
systemic events, we evaluate the joint role of domestic and global vulnerabilities. This 
strategy encompasses traditional approaches that look only at the role of domestic 
vulnerabilities (Bussière and Fratzscher, 2006 and Berg, Borensztein and Pattillo, 
2005) and other studies showing that global vulnerabilities are important determinants 
of domestic financial instability (Alessi and Detken, 2011). In addition, we also 
analyse the role of the interactions between domestic factors and the interplay of 
global developments with the domestic conditions. Third, we evaluate both "stand 
alone" macroprudential indicators of vulnerabilities and composite indicators 
calculated using discrete choice models. The evaluation of the indicators is done with 
a common methodology that takes into account policy makers’ preferences between 
issuing false alarms and missing systemic events (Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache, 
1999, Bussière and Fratzscher, 2008 and Alessi and Detken 2011). We therefore are 
able to test whether a multivariate analysis based on discrete choice models 
outperforms stand alone indicators recently suggested by the literature. 
Our empirical analysis covers a set of 28 emerging market and advanced economies 
with quarterly data since 1990. Our results highlight the importance of considering 
jointly various indicators in a multivariate framework, as we find that discrete choice 
models outperform “stand alone” indicators in predicting systemic events. We find 
that taking into account jointly domestic and global macro-financial vulnerabilities 
greatly improves the performance of discrete choice models in forecasting systemic 
events. In addition, considering interactions between domestic and global macro-
financial vulnerabilities further improves the performance of the model. Our 
framework displays a good out-of-sample performance in predicting the last financial 
crisis. In particular, our model would have issued an early warning signal for the 
United States in 2006 Q2, 5 quarters before the emergence of the tensions in money 
markets  in August 2007  that started the crisis . Our analysis shows that both domestic 
(credit cycle and macro-overheating) and global factors (equity valuations and macro-
overheating) were important determinants of systemic risk in the United States in the 
period before the crisis. Knowing the sources of systemic risk can guide the policy 
maker in choosing policy responses. Some risks can be mitigated by domestic 
policies, however, the importance of global factors as sources of systemic risk 
suggests that international cooperation and coordinated policy action are crucial to 
preserve global financial stability. 6
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1 Introduction 
The current financial turmoil has demonstrated the importance of understanding and 
measuring systemic risks and predicting systemic events, i.e. events when financial 
instability becomes so widespread that it impairs the functioning of the financial 
system to the extent that economic growth and welfare suffer materially.
3
Borio and Lowe (2002, 2004) show that widespread financial distress typically arises 
from the unwinding of financial imbalances that build up disguised by benign 
economic conditions, such as periods of stable and low inflation. Using annual data 
for 34 countries for the period 1960-1999, they show that sustained rapid credit 
growth combined with large increases in asset prices increased the probability of 
episodes of financial instability. Recently, Cardarelli et al. (2011), using data for 17 
main advanced economies, show that the likelihood that stress in the financial system 
causes more severe economic downturns is higher when stress is preceded by the 
building up of balance sheet vulnerabilities in the form of a rapid expansion of credit, 
and a run-up in house prices. Moreover, in a paper closely related to our study, Misina 
and Tkacz (2009) investigate whether credit and asset price movements can help to 
predict financial stress in Canada by using linear and non-linear threshold models. 
According to their findings, business credit emerges as an important leading indicator 
among all variables considered in their study. 
The paper builds upon the above studies and contributes to the financial crisis 
literature by developing a unified framework for assessing systemic risks, stemming 
from domestic and global macro-financial vulnerabilities, and for predicting (out of 
sample) systemic events i.e. periods of extreme financial instability with potential real 
costs. Within this framework it is possible to assess the relative importance of the 
factors contributing to the probability of a systemic event. It is also possible to 
identify potential vulnerabilities on the basis of a scenario analysis of the evolution in 
the domestic and global macro-financial environment. 
We extend the existing literature on predicting financial crises in several ways. First, 
we identify past systemic events by using a composite index measuring the level of 
systemic tensions in the financial system of one country. This approach provides an 
objective criterion for the definition of the starting date of a crisis and it contrasts with 
the standard way of identifying crises that exploits qualitative information (see e.g. 
Laeven and Valencia, 2008). More specifically, we refine the approaches of the IMF 
(2009) and the ECB (2009a) by calculating a country specific Financial Stress Index 
(FSI) with a robust method of aggregation. This reduces the revisions to the index due 
to the arrival of new information and, therefore, it makes the index more suitable for 
the use in econometric models. We then identify systemic events as episodes of 
extreme financial stress that has led to negative real economic consequences on 
average
4. In this way, we avoid the selection bias that would occur if we chose only 
cases were extreme financial stress have always led to negative real economic 
consequences. The selection bias could emerge because a policy action (that we do 
3 See the definition of the concept of systemic risk in the ECB Financial Stability Review, December 
2009.  
4 According to the analysis in section 2, we identify an episode of extreme financial stress (or a 
systemic event) when the FSI crosses the 90
th
th
 percentile of the country distribution. We show in 
section 2 the 90  that financial stress exceeding   percentile threshold, on average, anticipates real costs.  7
ECB
Working Paper Series No 1311 
March 2011
not control for) might have prevented the negative economic outturn. Our approach to 
identify systemic events can be seen as an extension of Eichengreen et al. (1995),
where an index of exchange market pressure is used to identify currency crises
5.
Compared to Eichengreen et al. (1995), our financial stress index is broader than the 
exchange market pressure index because it includes several market segments. This 
enables us to identify episodes that are truly systemic and not segment specific. In 
addition, by defining systemic events as episodes of extreme financial stress with 
potential real economic consequences, we focus on financial crises that are relevant 
for policy makers who want to avoid real costs. The real cost dimension is absent in 
Eichengreen et al. (1995), where a simple statistical rule is used to identify crisis 
periods.
Second, in predicting the identified systemic events, we evaluate the joint role of 
domestic and global vulnerabilities. This strategy encompasses traditional approaches 
that look only at the role of domestic vulnerabilities (Bussière and Fratzscher, 2006 
and Berg, Borensztein and Pattillo, 2005) and other studies showing that global 
vulnerabilities are important determinants of domestic financial instability (Alessi and 
Detken, 2011). In addition, we also analyse the role of the interactions between 
domestic factors and the interplay of global developments with the domestic 
conditions.
Third, we evaluate both "stand alone" macroprudential indicators of vulnerabilities 
and composite indicators calculated using discrete choice models. The evaluation of 
the two categories of indicators is done with a common methodology that takes into 
account policy makers’ preferences between issuing false alarms and missing 
systemic events (Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache, 1999, Bussière and Fratzscher, 
2008 and Alessi and Detken 2011). We are therefore able to test whether a 
multivariate analysis based on discrete choice models outperforms stand alone 
indicators recently suggested by the literature. 
Our empirical analysis covers a set of 28 emerging market and advanced economies 
with quarterly data between 1990 Q1 and 2009 Q4. Our results show that stand alone 
measures of asset price misalignments and credit booms are in general useful leading 
indicators of systemic events. Interestingly, global measures of credit expansion and 
asset price developments perform better than indicators of domestic fragilities
6.
Interactions between domestic variables as well as between global and domestic 
variables are among the best stand alone indicators. However, our results highlight the 
importance of considering jointly various indicators in a multivariate framework, as 
we find that discrete choice models outperform “stand alone” indicators in predicting 
systemic events. We find that taking into account jointly domestic and global macro-
financial vulnerabilities greatly improves the performance of discrete choice models 
in forecasting systemic events. In addition, considering interactions between domestic 
and global macro-financial vulnerabilities further improves the performance of the 
model. Our framework displays a good out-of-sample performance in predicting the 
last financial crisis. Our model would have issued an early warning signal for the 
5 The index is calculated as equal variance weighted average of exchange rate changes, interest rate 
changes, and reserve changes. Crises are defined as periods when the pressure index is at least two 
standard deviations above the mean. 
6 These results are also supported by the conclusions of with Borio and Lowe (2002), Gerdesmeier et 
al. (2009) and Alessi and Detken (2011) 8
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United States in 2006 Q2, 5 quarters before the emergence of the tensions in money 
markets  in August 2007  that started the crisis . Our analysis show that both domestic 
(credit cycle and macro-overheating) and global factors (equity valuations and macro-
overheating) were important determinants of systemic risk in the United States in the 
period before the crisis. Knowing the sources of systemic risk can guide the policy 
maker in choosing policy responses. Some risks can be mitigated by domestic 
policies, however, the importance of global factors as sources of systemic risk 
suggests that international cooperation and coordinated policy action are crucial to 
preserve global financial stability. 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Chapter 2 introduces the measure 
4 presents the empirical analysis, while Chapter 5 concludes. 
2 Measuring financial stress and identifying systemic events 
Construction of the Financial Stress Index
To identify systemic events, we construct a Financial Stress Index (FSI) for each 
country in our sample, and evaluate at which levels it has, on average, had negative 
implications for the real economy. This approach, by capturing systemic tensions in 
the financial system of a country, provides an objective criterion for the definition of 
the starting date of a systemic event. Furthermore, it contrasts with the standard way 
of identifying crises that exploits qualitative information (see for example Laeven and 
Valencia, 2008). 
Typically, when negative shocks, such as bursts of asset price bubbles, or banking, 
financial and currency crises hit the economy, it is possible to observe tensions in 
several market segments. The larger and broader the shock is (i.e. the more systemic 
the shock is), the higher the co-movement among variables reflecting tensions. 
Therefore, by aggregating variables measuring stress across markets segments, it is 
possible to create a Financial Stress Index that captures the start and the evolution of a 
crisis
7.
Our FSI is a country-specific composite index, covering the main segments of the 
domestic financial market, and it consists of the following five components: (1) the 
spread of the 3-month interbank rate over the 3-month Government bill rate (Ind1)
8;
(2) negative quarterly equity returns (multiplied by minus one, so that negative returns 
increase stress; positive returns are disregarded and set to 0) (Ind2); (3) the realised 
volatility of the main equity index (Ind3); (4) the realised volatility of the nominal 
7 Several indices for the measurement of financial tensions have been developed in recent years, 
examples are Illing and Liu (2006) and Hakkio and Keeton (2009). The IMF (2008, 2009) presented 
the work by Cardarelli et al. (2009) and Balakrishnan et al. (2009), who constructed financial stress 
indices for a broad set of advanced and emerging economies. The ECB (2009a) presented a Financial 
Stress Index for the global economy, based on work by Fidora and Straub (2009). It should be 
highlighted that research on the measurement of financial stress and the construction of indices 
capturing systemic events is currently very active (see e.g. Hollo, Kremer and Lo Duca, 2010). 
8 Or the spread among the interbank and the T-bill rates of the closest maturity to three months when 
the latter maturity is not available. 
of financial stress used to identify systemic events. Chapter 3 describes the data. Chapter 9
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effective exchange rate (Ind4); and (5) the realised volatility of the yield on the 3-
month Government bill (Ind5)
9.
Each component j of the index for country i at quarter t is transformed into an integer 
that ranges from 0 to 3 according to the country-specific quartile of the distribution 
the observation at quarter t belongs to (qj,i,t). For example, a value for component j
falling into the fourth quartile of the distribution would be transformed into “3”
10.
Note that each variable is measured in a way that higher values indicate higher stress 
levels, therefore higher values of the transformed variables indicate higher stress. 
The Financial Stress Index is computed for country i at time t as a simple average of 





, , , ,
,
¦
   
j
t i j t i j
t i
Ind q
FSI  (1) 
Hollo, Kremer and Lo Duca (2010) show that the standardization method based on 
quartiles that we use is more robust than a standardization based on mean and 
variance, especially when the number of components of the index is small. More 
specifically, with the “quartile” standardization method, adding new observations to 
the sample produces only small revisions to the historical levels of the index (ex post
stability). Large revisions of the historical levels of the index would complicate the 
analysis of the Financial Stress Index and its use in econometric models
11.
In calculating the Financial Stress Index, we face a trade off between the degree of 
precision of the index at the country level and the degree of homogeneity of the index 
across countries and time. For some countries with more developed financial systems, 
it would be possible to calculate a more detailed Financial Stress Index aggregating 
the information from several financial instruments and several markets segments. The 
set of instruments and segments is, however, limited for the emerging economies that 
are included in our sample. Since in our study the cross country dimension prevails, 
we give more importance to the homogeneity of the Financial Stress Index across 
countries. We believe this does not affect our results mainly for two reasons. First, 
once some crucial segments of the financial system are included in the index, adding 
components to it does not substantially change the “shape” of financial stress indices 
(Hollo, Kremer and Lo Duca, 2010). Second, our focus is on the detection of systemic 
events, i.e. we look only at extreme values of financial stress. Identified extreme 
values are robust to the composition of the FSI. 
9 In the calculation of realised volatilities for equity, nominal effective exchange rate and Government 
bill rate, i.e. components (Ind3) to (Ind5), average daily absolute changes over a quarter were used. 
10 The only exception to this standardisation method is the indicator for negative stock market returns. 
We
 then rescale the transformed indicator so that it ranges from 0 to 3. 
11 Hollo, Kremer and Lo Duca (2010) discuss advantages and disadvantages of approaches for the 
calculation of financial stress indices.  
To standardise this variable we just divide this indicator by its maximum value over the sample. 10
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The financial stress indices for countries in the sample are plotted in Figures A1 and 
A2 in the Appendix. As it can be seen from the Figures, the FSIs capture well past 
episodes of high financial stress or crises, such as the Asian financial crisis in 1997, 
the Russian crisis in 98, the burst of the IT bubble in 2000-2001 and the last Global 
Financial Crisis. For many advanced economies, the Global Financial Crisis led to the 
highest level of financial stress since the start of the sample in 1990, while in many 
emerging economies the level of financial stress was higher during the Asian financial 
crisis, or during some country-specific crisis, such as the Russian crisis of 1998 or the 
crisis in Argentina of 2001.  
Financial stress and the real economy 
Financial instability and stress can impact economic activity through various 
channels. First, shocks that affect the creditworthiness of borrowers tend to strengthen 
the output fluctuations through the financial accelerator, as changes in the values of 
collateral impact the willingness of the financial system to provide credit to the 
economy (Bernanke and Gertler, 1995, and Bernanke et al., 1999, Kiyotaki and 
Moore, 1997). Second, factors that impact lenders’ balance sheets can magnify 
economic downturns as if banks’ capital is weakened, banks may become more 
reluctant to provide capital to the real sector or can even be forced to deleverage, 
leading to sharper economic downturns (Bernanke and Lown, 1991, Kashyap and 
Stein, 1995). Third, the development and structure of the financial system determine 
the degree of interconnection between real and financial sectors in the economy (IMF, 
2006, Rajan and Zingales, 2003). 
Recently, Cardarelli et al. (2011) show that out of 113 financial stress episodes 
identified for 17 main advanced economies since 1980, 29 were followed by an 
economic slowdown and an equal number by recessions. The remaining 55 financial 
stress episodes were not followed by an economic downturn. The authors find that the 
median cumulative output losses (relative to trend or until recovery) in downturns that 
followed financial stress episodes were about 2.8 percent of GDP for slowdowns and 
about 4.4 percent of GDP for recessions. Real costs of downturns anticipated by 
financial stress episodes are found to be significantly larger than the real costs of 
downturns that were not preceded by financial stress. 
Policy makers’ main concern regarding financial stress is that financial instability 
could become so widespread that it would impair the functioning of the financial 
system to the extent that economic growth and welfare suffer materially. Therefore, it 
is important to study the relationship between the Financial Stress Index and measures 
of real economic activity, and to calibrate the thresholds for the FSI at which negative 
economic outcomes have occurred in the past
12. One way to do this is to analyse the 
relationship between the Financial Stress Index and the real GDP.  
Figure 1 reports the median deviation (in percent) of the real GDP from its trend
13
(output gap) for different percentiles of the distribution of the Financial Stress Index 
(two quarters ahead). As it can be seen from the Figure, levels of the Financial Stress 
12 Hakkio and Keeton (2009) perform a similar analysis of the linkages between financial stress shocks 
and economic performance. 
13 The trend is calculated using Hodrick-Prescott filter with the smoothing parameter set to 1600.  11
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Index above the 90th percentile of the country distribution of the index anticipate 
negative deviations of the real GDP from its trend (i.e. economic slowdowns or 
recessions).  
(INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE) 
Furthermore, Figure 2 shows the evolution of the deviation of the real GDP from its 
trend in the quarters after financial stress reached the last decile of the country 
distribution. It can be seen that the high level of stress anticipates a significant 
slowdown in economic activity that lasts up to 5 quarters. During the period while 
GDP remains below the trend, the cumulated costs range between 4 to 5% of the 
GDP.
(INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE) 
These findings confirm that high levels of financial stress should be a concern for 
policy makers, as they could lead to a slowdown of the economy or even to a loss of 
the level of the real output. Thus, our focus will be on periods of extreme financial 
stress.
In the analysis, we focus on episodes of extreme financial stress that have often, i.e. 
on median cases, led in the past to negative consequences for the real economy. We 
define these episodes as systemic events. We focus on the level of stress that on 
average have led to negative real consequences to avoid a selection bias by choosing 
only cases were financial stress have for certainty led to negative real economic 
consequences. This is because a policy action might have prevented the negative 
economic outturn. 
In our benchmark case we identify systemic events when the Financial Stress Index 
crosses the 90
th percentile of the country distribution. We adopt this threshold because 
on average it anticipates real consequences in terms of negative deviation of real GDP 
from trend, as suggested by Figure 1. Following this approach, we identify a set of 94 
systemic events. We find the following starting dates for well known crisis episodes 
in the 1990s and 2000s: 1994 Q1 for Brazil, 1994 Q4 for the Mexican crisis; 1997 Q2 
for the Asian crisis in Thailand, 1997 Q3 for Hong Kong and other main Asian 
countries, 1998 Q3 for the Russian crisis, 1999 Q1 for the Brazilian crisis; 2001 Q3 
many cases, these episodes spread to several other economies. For example, after 
starting in 2007 Q3 with severe problems in money markets and volatility in other 
market segments in the United States and in the euro area, the latest crisis spread in 
successive waves across countries in 2008 Q1, 2008 Q3 and finally it reached 
emerging markets in 2008 Q4. Several of the episodes that we identify are also in the 
list of crises compiled by Laeven and Valencia (2008).  
Our approach to identify systemic events can be seen as an extension of Eichengreen 
et al. (1995), where an index of exchange market pressure is used to identify currency 
for the Argentinean crisis; 2007 Q3 for the last financial crisis in the United States. In 12
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crises
14. Compared to Eichengreen et al. (1995), our Financial Stress Index is broader 
than the exchange market pressure index, because it includes several market 
segments. This enables us to identify episodes that are truly systemic and not segment 
specific. In addition, by defining crises as episodes of extreme financial stress with 
potential real economic consequences, we focus on events that are relevant for policy 
makers who want to avoid real costs. The real cost dimension is absent in Eichengreen 
et al. (1995), where a simple statistical rule is used to identify crisis periods. 
Definition of the dependent variable 
The objective of the study is predicting the occurrence of systemic events within a 
given time horizon that in our benchmark specification is set to 6 quarters
15. To do 
this, we proceed in three steps: 
First, we transform the Financial Stress Index into a binary variable that we call 
“systemic event”. The variable takes value 1 in the quarter when the FSI moves above 
the predefined threshold of the 90
th percentile of the country distribution that 
anticipates real consequences on average, as suggested by Figure 1.  
Second, we set the dependent variable to 1 in the 6 quarters preceding the systemic 
event and to 0 in all the other periods. The dependent variable mimics an ideal leading 
indicator that perfectly signals “systemic events” by “flashing” in the 6 quarters 
before the event. 
Finally, we drop from the sample all the observations that are not informative about 
the transition from tranquil times to systemic events. It means that we drop the periods 
when financial stress remains above the predefined threshold that identifies systemic 
events. We also drop tranquil periods that are not longer than 6 quarters, as the short 
distance between the extreme stress episodes delimiting them suggests that we should 
not consider these periods as “normal”.
16
14 The index is calculated as equal variance weighted average of exchange rate changes, interest rate 
changes, and reserve changes. Crises are defined as periods when the pressure index is at least two 
standard deviations above the mean. 
15 The time horizon of 6 quarters is chosen because within this time interval policy makers can adopt 
measures to prevent the materialisation of systemic events. Shorter time horizons are less relevant for 
policy making because the potential for effective pre-emptive actions is lower. For robustness, we 
anyway try time horizons of 2, 4 and 8 quarters. The results are discussed in the section on the 
robustness tests. 
16 Bussière and Fratzscher (2006) point out that including in the estimation of early warning models the 
period of economic recovery after a crisis produces the so called “post crisis bias”. In recovery periods, 
economic variables go through an adjustment process before reaching again the path they have during 
tranquil periods. The recovery period therefore should be excluded from the analysis as it is not 
informative of the path leading from the pre-crisis regime to the crisis. Bussière and Fratzscher address 
this issue by using a multinomial logit model with “three regimes” for the dependent variable (calm 
period, crisis and recovery). In our paper, as we drop periods in which stress is high, potentially we 
already disregard recovery periods, at least partially. However, we check the robustness of our results 
by dropping observations up to two quarters after the end of the stress periods to ensure that the post 
crisis bias is addressed. Only marginal gains in the performance of the model are obtained when 
dropping the additional two quarters. 13
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3. Data 
To assess the level of systemic risks and to predict systemic events, we construct 
indicators commonly used in the macroprudential literature to predict crises (Borio 
and Lowe, 2002 and 2004, and Alessi and Detken, 2011). These indicators capture the 
building up of vulnerabilities and imbalances both in the domestic and global 
economy. In this regard, we focus on asset price and credit developments, valuation 
levels and proxies for leverage in the economy. However, we also control for 
macroeconomic conditions with a broad set of indicators.  
We build a comprehensive dataset of quarterly macro and financial data for period 
1990 Q1 – 2009 Q4 for 28 countries, of which 10 advanced countries and 18 
emerging economies
17. The  data is obtained either from Haver Analytics, Bloomberg 
and Datastream
18.
Table 1 summarises the core variables included in the study.
(INSERT TABLE 1 HERE) 
Following the literature (e.g. Alessi and Detken, 2011), we test several 
transformations of the indicators, such as annual changes and deviations from moving 
averages or trends
19. To proxy for global macro-financial imbalances and 
vulnerabilities, we calculate a set of global indicators by averaging the transformed 
variables for the following four countries or regions: the United States, euro area, 
Japan and the United Kingdom
20.
Starting from the core set of variables listed in Table 1, we calculate interactions 
between domestic variables, between international variables and between domestic 
and international variables. Interactions are calculated by multiplying the relevant 
variables and are aimed to capture the joint dynamic of two indicators. The first group 
of interactions measures the joint dynamics of asset price growth and asset valuations. 
They are calculated by multiplying all possible measures of asset price growth by all 
possible measures of asset valuation included in our core set of indicators reported in 
Table 1. We calculate these interactions both for domestic and global variables. The 
second group of interactions measures the joint dynamics of credit growth and 
leverage. They are calculated by multiplying all possible core indicators of credit 
growth by core indicators of leverage. Also these interactions are calculated both for 
domestic and global variables. In addition, we calculate other domestic interactions 
capturing the joint dynamic of asset prices and credit by multiplying indicators of 
17 The advanced countries are the following: Australia, Denmark, Euro area, Japan, New Zealand, 
Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The emerging economies 
are the following: Argentina, Brazil, China, Czech Republic, Hong Kong, Hungary, India, Indonesia, 
Malaysia, Mexico, the Philippines, Poland, Russia, Singapore, South Africa, Taiwan, Thailand and 
Turkey.
18 Credit and money variables are seasonally adjusted using X12 seasonal adjustment procedure, and all 
real variables are deflated using CPI price index 
19 We estimate the trend with the Hodrick-Prescott filter. Following Borio and Lowe (2004), we use 
two different values of the smoothing parameter, namely 1600 and 400,000. 
20 We also calculated global averages by using weighted GDP averages of all countries in our sample. 
We only report the results for the global variables calculated using the United States, euro area, Japan 
and the United Kingdom as the results are substantially the same. 14
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asset price growth or valuation by indicators of credit growth or leverage. We finally 
calculate interactions between domestic and global variables by multiplying domestic 
indicators of asset price growth and valuation, and indicators of credit growth and 
leverage by their equivalent indicators measured at the global level. In total, our 
dataset includes more than 200 indicators. 
Our analysis is conducted as much as possible in a real-time analysis fashion
21. At 
each point in time, only information available to the policy makers up to that point in 
time is used. This implies that we take into account that certain variables, as for 
example GDP, are not available to the policy makers in real time because of 
publication lags. To take into account publications lags, we used lagged variables. For 
GDP, money and credit related indicators the lag ranges from 1 to 2 quarters 
depending on the country. 
The real time analysis also implies that de-trended variables are computed using only 
real time information. Therefore, we recursively calculate trends at each time t, using 
only the information available up to that moment. 
4. Empirical Analysis 
In order to test the performance of different stand alone indicators of vulnerabilities 
and their joint performance in the discrete choice model framework, we evaluate the 
indicators on the basis of assumptions on policy makers’ preferences between issuing 
false alarms and missing systemic events.  
In doing so, we calculate optimal thresholds for policy intervention for both stand 
alone indicators of vulnerabilities and for the probabilities of systemic events 
estimated with discrete choice models. 
The remaining of the section is organised in the following way. First, we describe the 
approach used to extract early warning signals from the indicators, while taking into 
account policy makers’ preferences. Second, we report the empirical investigation 
using stand alone measures of financial fragilities. Third, we report the empirical 
investigation with the discrete choice models. Fourth, we run an out–of-sample 
forecast exercise. Finally, we discuss the robustness of our analysis. 
Evaluation of signals and calculation of optimal threshold for the indicators 
To find out which vulnerabilities are the best indicators of systemic risks and systemic 
events, and to calibrate the optimal threshold for policy action, we follow the 
approaches by Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (2000) and Alessi and Detken 
(2011)
22. The optimal threshold for policy action for an indicator is the one that 
maximises a measure of utility (i.e. “usefulness”) that takes into account policy maker 
21 The literature on early warning models deals with large datasets of macro data for several countries 
of which several are emerging markets. "Real time datasets" that contain information on the revisions 
of data after the first publication do not exist yet for several countries in our sample. Our analysis is 
therefore a real-time analysis in the sense that we take into account publication lags, as in other early 
warning models (Alessi and Detken, 2011).
22 Bussière and Fratzscher (2008) also address the issue of policy maker preferences in calibrating the 
optimal early warning thresholds and the timing of policy interventions.  15
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preferences between Type I and Type II errors
23. Once the optimal threshold is found 
for each indicator on the basis of a set of preferences, the best performing indicator is 
the one that maximises the measure of usefulness among all indicators. We discuss 
next how to calculate the measure of usefulness for an indicator for a given threshold 
and set of preferences. 
As it is common in the signalling literature (Kaminsky, Lizondo and Reinhart, 1998), 
a signal is issued when the indicator is above the predefined threshold. Consequently, 
we can classify the outcomes according to the following schema: 
Systemic event within a 
given time horizon 
No systemic event within a 
given time horizon 






The indicator is below the 




(correct absence of 
signals)
Following Alessi and Detken (2011), we then define a loss function that depends on 
the preferences of the policy maker between Type I and Type II errors: 
L(μ) = μ (C /(A + C)) + (1 - μ)  (B  /  (B  +  D))       (2) 
The term C / (A + C) is the share of systemic events that have not been signalled (i.e. 
the share of missing signals or Type I errors), while B / (B + D) is the share of 
tranquil (normal) periods that were incorrectly signalled as systemic events (i.e. the 
share of false alarms or Type II errors). 
The parameter μ describes the relative preference of the policy maker between Type I 
and Type II errors. For a value of μ = 0.5, the policy maker is equally concerned about 
Type I and Type II errors. The policy maker is less concerned of missing signals when 
μ < 0.5. Conversely, the policy maker is less concerned of issuing wrong signals when 
μ > 0.5. 
If the policy maker disregards the signal given by the indicator (i.e. either she assumes 
that a signal is never issued or that the signal is always issued) she faces a loss equal 
to Min [μ , 1 - μ]. 
Thus, an indicator is “useful” for the policy maker if the loss obtained by ignoring the 
indicator is higher than the loss obtained by taking it into consideration. It is possible 
to define the usefulness U in the following way: 
U = Min [μ , 1 - μ] – L (μ)         (3) 
The measure of usefulness U is computed for each indicator and for each threshold 
(and for different set of preferences). For a given set of preferences, the best threshold 
23 Normally, the threshold for an indicator is chosen based on some kind of information criteria, e.g. 
noise-to-signal ratio. Bussière and Fratzscher (2008) and Alessi and Detken (2011) highlight that this 
approach has several drawbacks. 16
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for an indicator is the one that achieves the highest score in terms of U among the 
tested thresholds. The best indicator is the one that achieves the highest U among all 
the indicators. 
At this stage it is important to clarify (i) how thresholds are selected and (ii) the 
assumptions on the parameter μ describing policy maker preferences. 
We express thresholds as percentiles of the distribution of the indicators by country. 
This procedure generates country-specific cut-off levels for each indicator. Thus, our 
approach lies between those of Borio and Lowe (2004) and Alessi and Detken (2011). 
The former test the predictive power of constant cut-off levels across time and 
countries. The latter express thresholds at time t as percentiles of the distribution of 
the indicators by country up to time t, therefore the cut-off levels are country and time 
dependent. This approach is the ideal choice for real time analysis, as only the 
information available to policy makers in real time is used. In our paper, we have to 
depart from this approach as the length of our data sample does not allow us to 
compute percentiles in real time. However, we adopt the “pure” real time approach, 
when we evaluate the out-of-sample performance of our indicators in predicting the 
last Global Financial Crisis. 
Regarding policy makers’ preferences, in our benchmark analysis we take the point of 
view of a policy maker who is equally concerned of issuing false alarms and missing 
systemic events, i.e. we assume that μ = 0.5. This could be considered the point of 
view of a neutral external observer who does not want to commit any mistakes and is 
only concerned of correctly calling a systemic event. The point of view of local policy 
makers or international institutions in charge of giving policy recommendations could 
be different, as the costs of missing systemic events and issuing false alarms are 
different (e.g. through reputational costs or real costs). It is likely that the last 
financial crisis increased the concerns of policy makers of missing systemic events. 
However, it is difficult to assess whether policy makers could be assumed to be 
relatively more concerned of missing crises versus issuing false alarms
24.
Stand alone indicators of vulnerability 
In the following, we test the predictive power of all the indicators that we have in our 
dataset that were described in Section 3. The dataset includes several domestic and 
global stand alone indicators of vulnerabilities inspired by the early warning system 
and macroprudential literature, and based on asset price (equity and property prices), 
credit (credit and monetary aggregates) and macro (GDP, inflation, government 
deficit, current account deficit) developments. We evaluate the performance of the 
different indicators according to the evaluation method discussed in the previous 
section.
Table 2 reports the best performing 5 global indicators (upper part) and domestic ones 
(lower part), as well as some statistics to assess the efficiency of the indicators in 
predicting systemic events over a horizon of 6 quarters, under the assumption that 
preferences are balanced between issuing false alarms and missing signals (ȝ=0.5). 
24 For a more comprehensive discussion of the issue, see Bussière and Fratzscher (2008) and Alessi and 
Detken (2011). 17
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More specifically, Table 2 reports usefulness U, the noise-to-signal ratio (NtSr), the 
percentage of systemic events predicted by the indicator (%predicted), the probability 
of a systemic event conditional to a signal (Cond Prob) and the difference between the 
conditional and the unconditional probability of a systemic event (Prob Diff)
25.
(INSERT TABLE 2 HERE) 
The following observations can be made regarding stand alone indicators: 
x Overall, the majority of indicators have a larger than zero “usefulness”, which 
means that the neutral observer would benefit from using the indicators rather 
than ignoring them
26.
x The best stand alone indicator among all is a global indicator, namely the 
percentage deviation of the ratio equity market capitalisation to GDP from the 
trend. This is in contrast with other studies that find that the deviation from 
trend of the ratio credit to GDP is the best indicator (Alessi and Detken, 2011 
for example). However, according to our results, the deviation from trend of 
the global credit to GDP ratio ranks as second best stand alone indicator. In 
general, the performance of indicators based on equity prices is very similar to 
the performance of indicators based on credit aggregates. 
x Credit indicators dominate indicators for monetary aggregates, as the latter do 
not appear among the top indicators. This confirms the finding of the literature 
that credit is a better predictor of financial crisis/stress than money aggregates 
(see e.g. Alessi and Detken 2011, Borio and Lowe 2004, or Schularick and 
Taylor 2009). 
x Global indicators perform better than domestic indicators (in line with Alessi 
and Detken, 2011). The top 5 global indicators are the best performers among 
all indicators, while the first domestic indicator ranks only seventh among all 
the indicators. 
x Interactions among indicators are important. The interaction between real 
equity prices growth and equity valuations (price/earning ratio) at the global 
level is among the top 5 global indicators. Also, among the domestic factors 
the interaction between growth in real equity prices and valuation ratios 
(price/earning ratio) ranks the second best. 
x “Overheating” at the global level (i.e. the percentage deviation from trend of 
the real GDP at the global level), figures among the top indicators. 
Discrete choice models – a logit model 
Next, we use a logit model to jointly estimate the impact of multiple vulnerability 
indicators to the probability of a systemic event. Furthermore, we calculate the 
optimal thresholds for policy intervention, by using the approach that takes into 
25 As in Kaminsky et al. (2008) the efficiency measures are calculated in the following way: the noise 
to signal ratio (NtSr) is the ratio between false signals as a proportion of periods in which false signals 
could have been issued and good signals as a proportion of periods in which good signals could have 
been issued (i.e. NtSr = (B/(B+D))/(A/(A+C))). The percentage of crisis predicted by the indicator 
(%predicted) is simply the ratio between good signals and the number of periods in which good signals 
could have been issued (% predicted = A/(A+C)). The probability of a crisis conditional on a signal 
(Cond Prob) is the ratio between good signals and the total number of signals issued (Cond Prob = 
A/(A+B)). Finally the difference between the conditional and the unconditional probability of a crisis 
(Prob Diff) is calculated as Cond Prob – (A + C) / (A + B + C + D). 
26  The full set of results for stand alone indicators is available from the authors on request. 18
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account policy makers’ preferences, described at the beginning of the Chapter. This 
approach departs from the standard practise used in the early warning models, where 
arbitrary thresholds for the estimated probabilities are used to signal incoming 
systemic events. The identification of early warning thresholds also helps the policy 
maker to judge in real time, whether the probabilities are elevated. 
The benchmark specification of the logit model is the following: 









         ( 4 )  
where ,, Pr 1 it it ob dep ªº   ¬¼  is the probability of a systemic event for a country i at time t
within the next h=[2,4,6,8] quarters, and Xit is the set of macro-financial 
vulnerabilities observed in country i at time t. As described in Section 2, we set our 
dependent variable depi,t to 1 in the h quarters preceding the systemic event, and to 0  
in all the other periods. The dependent variable mimics an ideal leading indicator that 
perfectly signals “systemic events” by “flashing” in the h quarters before the event. In 
our benchmark specification h =6. 
The country specific probability of a systemic event, i.e. systemic risk, is a function of 
predicting crises, according to the analysis carried out in the previous section. In our 
benchmark model, the explanatory variables are grouped into three main sets, namely 
the domestic, the global and the interactions between domestic and global factors.  
The first set consists of variables that measure domestic conditions. It includes growth 
in domestic asset prices (equity) and bank credit, asset price valuation levels, and the 
level of leverage in the economy. In our benchmark specification, growth in equity 
prices and bank credit are measured by the real (net of inflation) annual growth of the 
local MSCI equity index and of the amount outstanding of credit granted to the 
private sector. Asset price valuations are measured by the deviation of the ratio equity 
market capitalisation to GDP from its trend, while leverage is measured as the 
deviation of the ratio private credit to GDP from its trend
27. The domestic block of 
variables also includes the interaction between asset price developments and valuation 
levels, as well as the interaction between credit growth and leverage. The interactions 
are computed by the product of the two relevant variables. Finally, domestic 
macroeconomic environment is controlled for with the following variables: annual 
real GDP growth, annual CPI inflation, current account deficit in percentage of GDP, 
and government deficit in percentage of GDP. 
                                                
27 Trends are computed with the Hodrick-Prescott filter setting the smoothing parameter Ȝ to 400,000. 
Regarding, equity valuations it would be optimal to use price earning ratios, however time series for 
these data are not available since 1990 for a large portion of our set of countries. Therefore, we opted to 
use the ratio equity market capitalisation to GDP as a proxy for valuations after de-trending the ratio to 
correct for the non-stationarity due the progress in developing local stock markets. Regarding leverage, 
the deviation from the trend of the ratio private credit to GDP is a commonly used measure of leverage 
(Borio and Lowe, 2002), against the background of the lack of uniform coverage across countries and 
time of data on leverage of financial intermediaries, households and corporations. 
macro-financial vulnerabilities that are shown to perform well as stand alone indicators
 for 19
ECB
Working Paper Series No 1311 
March 2011
The second set of explanatory variables aims at capturing the global macro-financial 
environment. These variables are included because from the recent literature on 
macroprudential indicators (Alessi and Detken, 2011) and from our empirical analysis 
of stand alone indicators of vulnerabilities, it emerges that global factors have a 
significant influence on domestic financial stability. Similarly to the domestic set of 
variables, we include growth in global asset prices and bank credit, global asset price 
valuation levels, and the global level of leverage to the model. In addition, the set of 
explanatory variables also includes the interaction between global asset price 
developments and valuation levels, as well as the interaction between global credit 
growth and leverage. Finally, global macroeconomic conditions are captured by real 
GDP growth and inflation.  
The third set of explanatory variables includes the interplay between domestic and 
global indicators of vulnerabilities, computed as the product between the relevant 
domestic and international variables. The introduction of this group of variables 
captures additional fragilities that emerge when the overheating of the domestic 
economy coincides with the vulnerabilities in the global conditions. 
In the robustness section, we evaluate our results by changing the specification of the 
benchmark model and the variables used to measure the different fragilities. 
Regarding the estimation strategy, due data limitations, we pool the information of 
our unbalanced panel, and assume that the constant c and the slope coefficients ȕ of 
the logit model do not change across time and countries. The appropriateness of a 
pooled approach is discussed by Fuertes and Kalotychou (2006) and Davis and Karim 
(2008).
To take into account country specific fixed effects and potential cross country 
differences in the scale of the regressors, as well as to avoid that our results are 
affected by large outliers, we follow the method by Berg, Borensztein and Pattillo 
(2005), and measure variables in country specific percentile terms. 
Table 3 reports the estimated coefficients for the benchmark model (column 5), that 
includes the set of explanatory variables described above, as well as statistics for 
alternative models that are used for comparison (columns 1-4). The alternative models 
are:
x “Currency crisis” model: it includes explanatory variables often used in the 
currency crises literature, as for example the real exchange rate, macro 
conditions and credit growth (see table 3).  
x “Macroprudential” model: it adds equity price growth and valuation to the set 
of explanatory variables of the “Currency crisis” model
28.
x   “Domestic” model: it includes the explanatory variables of the 
“Macroprudential” model with the addition of (i) the general government 
deficit, (ii) the interaction between equity growth and equity valuation, and 
(iii) the interaction between credit growth and leverage. 
x “Domestic and international (no interactions)” model: it includes the 
explanatory variables of the “Domestic” model with the exclusion of the 
                                                
28 However, it excludes the real exchange rate due to data limitations. 20
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interactions terms. It also includes global growth and inflation, as well as 
global credit growth and leverage, and global equity growth and valuation. 
Table 3 also includes the estimated marginal effects of the independent variables in 
the benchmark model (column 6) and the estimated coefficients for two models that 
use data only for the 18 emerging markets included in our sample (columns 7 and 8).  
As the main objective of the paper is to evaluate the performance of the models in 
predicting systemic events according to the framework that takes into account policy 
maker preferences, we draw the attention of the reader only on a few features that 
emerge from Table 3
29.
First, the fit of the benchmark model (column 5) is better than the fit of any alternative 
model (with the exclusion of the models that include emerging markets only). Second, 
the information criteria support the choice of the benchmark model and the inclusion 
of interaction terms
30. Third, in the benchmark model, domestic factors, as well as 
global factors and the interaction between domestic and global ones are statistically 
significant and have, in most cases, the expected signs. Fourth, the estimated 
coefficients (and marginal effects) capturing the impact of global variables as well as 
those capturing the interaction between domestic and global variables are, in most 
cases, larger in the model for emerging markets only. This suggests that the 
determinants of systemic risks are the same in emerging and advanced economies. 
The main difference between emerging markets and advanced economies is the 
relative importance of the different factors, with emerging economies being more 
exposed to global factors
31.
We now turn to the evaluation of the performance of the models in predicting 
systemic events. The selection of the best model is done in the following way: once 
the probability of financial stress is estimated, we use the approach by Alessi and 
Detken (2011) to evaluate whether the policy maker can extract “useful” signals from 
it. Thus, we find the thresholds for the estimated probability that maximises the “U” 
statistic for each model (for the given preference parameter μ=0.5). The best model is 
the one that that achieves the highest usefulness U score for the given preference 
parameter. 
(INSERT TABLE 4 HERE) 
Table 4 reports the performance statistics for the above models. The main results are 
the following:  
x First, all models have larger than zero usefulness score U that means that the 
models provide statistical gains for policy makers who are equally concerned 
of issuing false alarms and missing systemic events. 
                                                
29 In addition, due to non-linearities and data transformations, the interpretation of the estimated 
coefficients is not straightforward. 
30 The AIC criterion for the models is the following: “Macroprudential” AIC=1235.8; “Domestic” 
AIC=1228.2; “Domestic and international (no interactions)” AIC=1041.2; “Benchmark” AIC=986.454. 
Models for emerging markets: “Domestic and international (no interactions)” AIC=623.9; 
“Benchmark” AIC=522.0. 
31 This conclusion is supported by Dungey et al. (2010). 21
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x Second, all the models except the “Currency crisis” model outperform the best 
stand alone indicators (see Table 2) in terms of their usefulness. The 
“Currency crisis” model, however, would rank third among stand alone 
indicators. 
x Third, the benchmark model including global variables and all the interactions 
clearly outperforms the other models. The benchmark model successfully 
predicts more than 80% of the systemic events. Furthermore, the difference 
between the unconditional probability and probability of a systemic event 
conditional to observing a signal from the model is almost 40%. 
To sum up, our results highlight that analysing multiple signals from various sources 
of vulnerabilities in a multivariate framework, such as the discrete choice models, are 
more comprehensive tools than stand alone indicators to assist policy makers in 
evaluating systemic risks and predicting systemic events. Furthermore, it is crucial to 
take into consideration both domestic and international sources of vulnerabilities as 
well as their interaction. 
We evaluate the out-of-sample performance of the Logit models over the evaluation 
period 2005 Q2 to 2007 Q2 (8 quarters) in the following way
32:
1) We recursively estimate the model at each quarter t in the evaluation period 
using the information that would have been available in real time from the 
beginning of the sample (1990 q1) to quarter t.
2) We collect the real time signals from the model over the evaluation period 
(assuming the benchmark scenario of a forecast horizon of 6 quarters and 
policy preference parameter of μ=0.5). 
3) We compute ex post the number of missed signals and false alarms issued by 
the model over the evaluation period and compute the measure of usefulness U 
described in the previous chapter. 
4) We rank the models according to the usefulness parameter (U). 
This approach provides a new, structured way to assess the out-of-sample 
performance of the models. 
Table 5 summarises the results of the out-of-sample evaluation, which indicate that 
the benchmark model and the three alternative models would have been useful tools 
for policy makers in predicting the last financial crisis. As it was the case with in-
sample predictions, the benchmark model that incorporates both domestic and global 
variables as well as their interactions outperforms by far the other models. 
(INSERT TABLE 4 HERE) 
Figure 3 shows the out-of-sample performance of the benchmark model for the United 
States for the last financial crisis. It shows that the probability of a systemic event 
                                                
32 We choose 2005Q2 as starting point for our real time evaluation of the model in order to have long 
enough time series for all the countries for expressing regressors in country specific percentiles. We 
stop the evaluation period in 2007Q2 as in 2007Q3 the last financial crisis started in the US. 
Out-of-sample performance of the Logit models 22
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within 6 quarters in the United States was close to the early warning threshold already 
in 2006 q1 and crossed it in 2006 q2. According to our Financial Stress Index, the 
switch from the tranquil period to the extreme financial stress period occurred in 2007 
Q3, when the tensions in the money markets emerged and spread to other segments of 
the financial system. Therefore, our benchmark model is able to correctly anticipate 
the systemic event with a lead of 5 quarters. Furthermore, in the 5 quarters preceding 
the crisis, it flags that the systemic risks are elevated and a systemic event could be 
imminent. 
(INSERT FIGURE 3 HERE) 
Source of systemic risk and policy analysis 
To choose the correct policy response, policy makers need to understand the factors 
contributing to the predicted systemic risks. Regarding the above example of the 
United States, Figure 4 shows the contribution of domestic and global macro-financial 
conditions to the probability of a systemic event as a percent share in 2006 Q2, and 
for comparison in 2006 Q4. As it is evident from the Figure, strong growth, as well as, 
buoyant equity markets occurring jointly at the domestic and global level (captured by 
the interaction between domestic and global factors) had the largest relative 
contribution to systemic risk (around 20.3%) in 2006 Q2. The other contributors to 
systemic risks were global equity market (18.7%); global macro conditions (17.7%), 
domestic credit cycle (12.9%), domestic equity market (9.4%) and global credit cycle 
(5.0%)
33. Knowing the sources of systemic risk can guide the policy maker in 
choosing policy responses. Some risks can be mitigated by domestic policies, 
however, the importance of global factors as sources of systemic risk suggests that 
international cooperation and coordinated policy action are important to preserve 
financial stability. 
(INSERT FIGURE 4 HERE) 
Robustness checks
In order to ensure the robustness of the results, we conducted the following robustness 
tests on discrete choice models: 
x Definitions of vulnerabilities. We tested various definitions and 
transformations of the vulnerabilities   . Overall, the results from the alternative
 models were qualitatively the same as in the benchmark model.  Moreover,
 they always had relatively high positive values of the usefulness parameter U,
 compared to the stand alone indicators of vulnerabilities. For instance,
 regarding asset valuations,  we used price/earnings  ratios  as  it is common in
 the literature, and obtained similar results to the benchmark model.  However, in
 this case, due to availability of data, our sample size was reduced and the
 analysis was not possible for all the countries in the sample. 
                                                
33 Potentially, it would be possible to decompose further systemic risk and calculate the contribution of 
each of the variables included in the logit model. 23
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x Contagion effects. To capture contagion effects we add the current average 
level of financial stress at the global level or, alternatively, in the region, to the 
set of explanatory variables. Adding contagion variables does not improve the 
performance of the benchmark model in predicting systemic events. 
x Role of capital inflows. Adding net capital inflows to the set of explanatory 
does not increase the performance of the model. The impact of capital inflows 
is indirectly captured by domestic asset price and credit dynamics. 
x Forecasting horizon.  We test the following forecast horizons for predicting 
systemic events: 2 quarters, 4 quarters, 6 quarters (benchmark) and 8 quarters. 
Overall, the performance of the model is relatively robust across forecasting 
horizons (see Table A1 in the Appendix). The best performance is achieved on 
average over the 8 quarter period, followed by the 6 quarter period. Normally, 
over the 4 and 2 quarter periods, the model performance slightly decreases
34.
x Policy markers’ preferences. In our benchmark analysis we assume that the 
policy maker has the preferences of a neutral observer (she is equally 
concerned of Type I and Type II errors). If we change this assumption (see 
Table A2 in the Appendix), we find that overall policy makers would benefit 
from the signals of the models as their usefulness score is positive, especially 
when the policy maker’s preferences are close to the balanced preferences (i.e. 
either ȝ=0.4 or ȝ=0.6).
x Post crisis bias. We test whether our results are affected by a post crisis bias. 
Bussière and Fratzscher (2006) point out that including in the estimation of 
early warning models the economic recovery period after a crisis produces so 
called “post crisis bias”. In recovery periods, economic variables go through 
an adjustment process before reaching again the path they have during tranquil 
periods. The recovery period, therefore, should be excluded from the analysis 
as it is not informative of the path leading from the pre-crisis regime to the 
crisis. Bussière and Fratzscher address this issue by using a multinomial logit 
model with “three regimes” for the dependent variable (calm period, crisis and 
recovery). In this paper, as we exclude from the estimation sample the periods 
in which financial stress is high following the switch from tranquil regime to 
an extreme stress regime, we at least partially disregard some periods of 
economic recovery. However, we check the robustness of our results by 
excluding observations up to two quarters after the end of the stress periods to 
ensure that the post crisis bias is addressed. Only marginal gains in the 
performance of the model are obtained when dropping the additional two 
quarters from the sample. 
5. Conclusions 
This paper contributes to the financial crisis literature by developing a unified 
framework for assessing systemic risks, stemming from domestic and global macro-
financial vulnerabilities, and for predicting (out-of-sample) systemic events i.e. 
periods of extreme financial instability with potential real costs. 
We extend the existing literature on predicting financial crises in several ways. First, 
we identify past systemic events by using a composite index measuring the level of 
                                                
34 The performance also decreases for time horizons longer than 8 quarters. 24
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systemic tensions in the financial system of one country. Second, in predicting the 
identified systemic events, we evaluate the joint role of domestic and global 
vulnerabilities. In addition, we also analyse the role of the interactions between 
domestic factors and the interplay of global developments with the domestic 
conditions. Third, we evaluate both "stand alone" macroprudential indicators of 
vulnerabilities and composite indicators calculated using discrete choice models. The 
evaluation of the indicators is done with a common methodology that takes into 
account policy makers’ preferences (Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache, 1999, Bussière 
and Fratzscher, 2008 and Alessi and Detken 2011). 
Our empirical analysis covers a set of 28 emerging market and advanced economies 
with quarterly data since 1990. Our results show that stand alone measures of asset 
price misalignments and credit booms are in general useful leading indicators of 
systemic events. Interestingly, global measures of credit expansion and asset price 
developments perform better than indicators of domestic fragilities
35. Interactions 
between domestic variables as well as between global and domestic variables are 
among the best stand alone indicators. However, our results highlight the importance 
of considering jointly various indicators in a multivariate framework, as we find that 
discrete choice models outperform “stand alone” indicators in predicting systemic 
events. We find that taking into account jointly domestic and global macro-financial 
vulnerabilities greatly improves the performance of discrete choice models in 
forecasting systemic events. In addition, considering interactions between domestic 
and global macro-financial vulnerabilities further improves the performance of the 
model. 
Our framework displays a good out-of-sample performance in predicting the Global 
Financial Crisis. Our model would have issued an early warning signal for the United 
States in 2006 Q2, 5 quarters before the emergence of the tensions in money markets 
that started the crisis in August 2007. Our analysis shows that both domestic (credit 
cycle and macro-overheating) and global factors (equity valuations and macro-
overheating) were important determinants of systemic risk in the United States in the 
period before the crisis. Knowing the sources of systemic risk can guide the policy 
maker in choosing policy responses. Some risks can be mitigated by domestic 
policies, however, the importance of global factors as sources of systemic risk 
suggests that international cooperation and coordinated policy action are crucial to 
preserve global financial stability. 
In principle, the framework can also be used to identify potential vulnerabilities on the 
basis of a scenario analysis of the evolution of the domestic and global macro-
financial environment. 
                                                
35 These results are also supported by the conclusions of with Borio and Lowe (2002), Gerdesmeier et 
al. (2009) and Alessi and Detken (2011) 25
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Table 2. Performance of stand alone indicators of vulnerabilities (ȝ=0.5 and 





U NtSr %Predicted Cond Prob Prob Diff
Percentage deviation of the ratio equity market 
capitalisation to GDP from Hodrick-Prescott  
(Ȝ=400000) trend 
55 0.21 0.45 76.91% 48.44% 18.72%
Percentage deviation of the ratio private credit 
to GDP from Hodrick-Prescott  (Ȝ=1600) trend 
55 0.21 0.43 73.09% 49.36% 19.63%
Percentage deviation of real GDP from Hodrick-
Prescott (Ȝ=1600) trend
60 0.16 0.50 64.69% 45.93% 16.21%
Interaction between real equity prices 
(percentage deviation from Hodrick-Prescott  
(Ȝ=400000) trend) and price earning ratios 
67 0.16 0.45 57.22% 48.80% 18.99%
Interaction between international and domestic 
real credit growth 





U NtSr %Predicted Cond Prob Prob Diff
Percentage deviation of the ratio equity market 
capitalisation to GDP from Hodrick-Prescott  
(Ȝ=400000) trend
68 0.15 0.46 54.22% 48.67% 18.44%
Interaction between real equity prices 
(percentage deviation from Hodrick-Prescott  
(Ȝ=400000) trend) and price earning ratios
71 0.14 0.44 50.21% 49.68% 19.52%
Percentage deviation of real equity prices from 
Hodrick-Prescott (Ȝ=400000) trend
55 0.13 0.60 66.04% 42.38% 11.92%
Percentage deviation of the ratio private credit 
to GDP from Hodrick-Prescott  (Ȝ=400000) 
trend 
55 0.12 0.63 66.34% 38.73% 10.28%
Percentage deviation of the private credit GDP 
ratio from 20 quarter moving average
79 0.12 0.35 37.54% 51.52% 24.49%
Notes: The Table reports the top 5 indicators for both the global (upper part) and domestic (lower part) 
category, and the optimal threshold in terms of percentile of the country distribution of the indicator at 
which the indicator issues a signal. Thresholds are calculated for ȝ=0.5 (neutral observer). The Table 
also reports in columns the following measures ot assess the efficiency of indicators: usefulness “U” 
(see formula 3); the noise to signal ratio (NtSr) i.e. the ratio between false signals as a proportion of 
periods in which false signals could have been issued and good signals as a proportion of periods in 
which good signals could have been issued (NtSr = (B/(B+D))/(A/(A+C))); the percentage of crisis 
predicted by the indicator (%predicted) i.e. the ratio between good signals and the number of periods in 
which good signals could have been issued (% predicted = A/(A+C)); the probability of a crisis 
conditional on a signal (Cond Prob) i.e. the ratio between good signals and the total number of signals 
issued (Cond Prob = A/(A+B)); the difference between the conditional and the unconditional 
probability of a jump (Prob Diff) i.e Cond Prob – (A + C) / (A + B + C + D). 30
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U NtSr %Predicted Cond Prob Prob Diff
Benchmark     
(EME only)
65 0.33 0.22 84.73% 63.24% 35.99%
Benchmark 68 0.32 0.20 80.95% 65.83% 37.83%
Benchmark        
(no interactions)
58 0.31 0.31 88.80% 55.52% 27.52%
Benchmark        
(no interactions - 
EME only)
68 0.30 0.24 78.33% 61.39% 34.14%
Domestic model 67 0.26 0.28 71.71% 57.79% 29.79%
Macro Prudential 63 0.24 0.34 74.23% 53.32% 25.32%
Currency crisis 69 0.19 0.38 60.33% 49.16% 22.33%
Notes: See notes to Table 2.32
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Table 5. Out-of-sample performance of Logit models (ȝ=0.5 and forecasting 
horizon 6 quarters). 
Model U NtSr %Predicted Cond Prob Prob Diff
Benchmark        
(EMEs only)
0.22 0.55 97.50% 39.39% 13.08%
Benchmark 0.18 0.57 83.91% 48.34% 13.54%
Benchmark        
(no interactions)
0.15 0.64 85.06% 45.40% 10.60%
Domestic Model 0.12 0.67 72.41% 44.37% 9.57%
Macro Prudential 0.10 0.75 77.01% 41.61% 6.81%
Benchmark        
(no interactions - 
only EMEs)
0.09 0.81 100.00% 30.53% 4.22%
Currency Crisis 0.06 0.84 77.01% 38.95% 4.15%
Notes: See notes to Table 33
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Figure 1. Level of the Financial Stress Index at quarter t and deviation of real 















































































Note: The X-axis represents the percentile of the country distribution of the Financial Stress Index at 
time t, while the Y-axis represents real GDP deviation from its trend at time t+2, measured in percent 
of the trend. 













Note: Extreme financial stress is an episode when financial stress crosses the 90
th percentile of the 
country distribution. The X-axis represents time (in quarters), while the Y-axis represents real GDP 
deviation from its trend, measured in percent of the trend. 34
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Figure 3. Predicting the 2008/2009 financial crisis in the United States.








































































Probability of a systemic
event within 6 quarters
Threshold (ȝ=0.5)
Note: The X-axis represents time (in quarters), while the Y-axis represents the probability of a systemic 
event within the next 6 quarters (threshold optimised for ȝ=0.5). The probability is the output of the 
benchmark logit model. 
Figure 4. Predicting the 2008/2009 financial crisis in the United States. Factors 
















Note: Domestic and global macro conditions include the following variables: real GDP growth, CPI 
inflation, current account deficit and General Government Deficit. Domestic and global equity market 
conditions include equity price growth, equity price level (misalignment) and their respective 
interaction terms. Domestic and global credit cycle include credit growth, proxy for leverage (deviation 
from trend credit to GDP ratio) and their respective interactions. Interactions of domestic and global 
factors include the interactions of domestic and global credit and equity price growth rates and 
misalignments. 35
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Table A1. Performance of the benchmark Logit model over different forecasting 






U NtSr %Predicted Cond Prob Prob Diff
Benchmark 8 quarters 62 0.34 0.19 84.43% 74.76% 38.99%
Benchmark 6 quarters 68 0.32 0.20 80.95% 65.83% 37.83%
Benchmark 4 quarters 67 0.30 0.29 83.54% 45.21% 26.15%
Benchmark 2 quarters 74 0.29 0.28 80.80% 28.21% 18.41%
Notes: See notes to Table 2.
Table A2. Performance of the benchmark Logit model using different values for 




U NtSr %Predicted Cond Prob Prob Diff
Benchmark 0.5 68 0.32 0.20 80.95% 65.83% 37.83%
Benchmark 0.4 69 0.23 0.19 79.83% 67.06% 39.06%
Benchmark 0.6 65 0.22 0.23 83.47% 62.74% 34.74%
Benchmark 0.7 53 0.14 0.37 91.88% 51.57% 23.57%
Benchmark 0.3 72 0.13 0.17 74.51% 69.27% 41.27%
Benchmark 0.8 53 0.07 0.37 91.88% 51.57% 23.57%
Benchmark 0.2 81 0.06 0.11 57.14% 77.27% 49.27%WORKING PAPER SERIES
NO 1311 / MARCH 2011
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